The Shift and Individuality of Japan’s Development Cooperation: 
A Joker in the New Scramble

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Introduction

No one can deny that the rise of the emerging economies represented by China has brought a huge impact to the post-Cold War international order. We can see the impact not only in the realm of geopolitics or trade, but also in development cooperation.

Emerging economies represented by China have increased development cooperation since the early 2000s, and that has brought confrontation between donors. While western donors emphasise ethical values in their aid, China takes gaining mutual benefit through development cooperation for granted. On the other hand, although the West often make use of their aid as a kind of leverage to engage in the recipients’ politico-economic reform to appeal to the universal norm, China respects the principle of non-interference and provides aid accordant with the recipients’ requests. Their dispute is especially fierce in Africa, back-grounded by their economic or strategic interests.

As regards the confrontation between western donors and China, Japan’s position is quite unique. Although Japan is a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), its development cooperation is not necessarily similar to western donors’. Rather, there are some commonalities with China’s, and the DAC often pointed out the characteristics. However, Japan has accelerated its approach since the early 2000s. What made it take the reaction? Will Japan separate itself from the western donors’ community? And, what are the implications in terms of the confrontation over development cooperation?

From these questions, we will consider the shift and individuality of Japan’s
development cooperation. First, we will begin by confirming the dispute over development cooperation between the West and emerging donors, especially China. Second, we will examine the history of the transition and continuity of Japan’s development cooperation. Third, we will consider current characteristics of Japan’s aid in Africa in terms of the relations with western donors and China. Finally, we will argue the meaning of Japan’s approach in terms of international politics over development cooperation in Africa.

1. Dispute over development cooperation

1-1 Standardised trend of development cooperation

Prior to considering emerging donors, we will briefly examine standardised trends of development cooperation to make their characteristics clear. One may say that the formal starting point of development cooperation was ‘point four’ of President Harry S. Truman’s inaugural speech (1949), and the Marshall Plan (1948) was the plot type of aid in the early days. Western countries led by the US had propelled developing infrastructure in developing countries with huge capital from the end of 1940s to the end of 1970s, under the influence of the Modernisation Theory. The ‘big-push approach’ was represented by the UN Development Decade Program initiated by President John F. Kennedy in 1961.

However, after the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by the IMF and the World Bank, or the Bretton-Woods Institutions (BWIs), in the 1980s, western donors began to use loans to engage in the decision-making of the recipient governments. The BWIs compelled the recipients in Latin America and Africa, which suffered from huge foreign debt caused by the Oil Crisis in 1973, to implement economic reforms through the SAPs based on Neo-liberalism, and ‘political conditionality’ like good governance was also added to the conditions of loans after the end of the Cold War. Yet, except for some exceptions like the ‘IMF’s star pupil’ Ghana,
unilateral SAPs did not necessarily bring the reduction of budget deficit and the economic growth to the recipients, but seemed to have brought serious impacts to the poor. Hence it is no wonder that the SAPs were criticised not only by the recipients, but also certain donors, like UNICEF.\(^1\)

Faced with the criticisms and activation of movement for debt relief represented by the Jubilee 2000, western donors including the BWIs turned their policy toward poverty reduction in the mid-1990s. We shall roughly sketch the characteristics of poverty reduction from three views; debt relief, basic social service (BSS) as the main purpose of aid, and collective commitment.

First, debt relief was the starting point of poverty reduction. The BWIs introduced the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative to cancel the debt of the HIPC in 1996, and expanded the objective in 1999. These are schemes for the HIPC to make use of money which has been cancelled for repayment for pro-poor development. It is necessary for the recipients to make the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which includes the report of the state of development and the plan for the improvement, by themselves. In parallel with this, grants were standardised as aid for low-income countries.

Second, western donors began to give priority to BSS, like primary education or public health, in their aid. In 1996, the same year as the introduction of the HIPC initiative, the DAC emphasised focus on BSS as the main purpose of ODA in its report, *Shaping the 21st Century*\(^2\). There is no need to add at this time that this trend is hugely based on Amartya Sen’s concept of ‘capability’. As a result, achieving individuals’ freedom of choice is set as the fundamental

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goal of development\textsuperscript{3}. From this perspective, it is no wonder that BSS organising the environment in which individuals can get along by their own will prioritised infrastructure or industrial assistance in development cooperation. In that sense, one may say that current western donors focus on an ethical norm in their development cooperation, even if the importance of economic growth is not ignored.

Third, and finally, western donors established new modes for providing aid: the Sector Wide Approaches for consulting with the recipient governments to implement sector reform, like education policy, and aid coordination among donors. In other words, western donors began to collectively commit to the recipient governments’ decision-making to achieve poverty reduction as the ‘common goal’, and that was justified in terms of effectiveness of aid\textsuperscript{4}. That has not been officially systematised in the DAC yet, and in most cases, donors being interested in any particular recipients \textit{ad hoc} compose like-minded donor groups (LMDGs). LMDGs, which are often led by the UK, generally share common pooled funds, and consult with the recipient governments over sector reform including fiscal policy\textsuperscript{5}.

Although poverty reduction with these three characteristics was originally from western donors, it was followed by the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2000. That meant that the global ‘poverty reduction regime’ was established,


\textsuperscript{4} In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, which is to consolidate aid coordination, five principles were emphasised for aid effectiveness; ownership, alignment, harmonisation, result, and mutual responsibility. See; OECD, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action (http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf).

\textsuperscript{5} In the case of the Program Aid Partners in Mozambique, fourteen DAC members and fifteen international organisations are involved in 2014 (http://www.pap.org.mz/eng/index.php/en/about-us/2014-04-15-12-29-36/international-organizations).
and that poverty reduction became a ‘common mission’ of donors and recipients. The regime was consolidated by the publication of the *DAC Guidelines: Poverty Reduction* in 2001. However, it must be noted that low-income countries had little choice but to follow the international community’s trend.

1-2 Characteristics of emerging donors’ development cooperation

Turning now to emerging donors, it is hard to grasp their performance comprehensively because of their low transparency, but they have gradually and partly presented it. Table 1 shows aid performance of main DAC members and emerging donors in 2009. Compared with the former’s volume, the latter’s was not necessarily numerous. Yet, regarding the pace of their growth, it seems reasonable to suppose that some emerging donors may catch up with the main western donors in the near future.

Either way, all emerging donors do not necessarily share the same characteristics. In general, ‘emerging donors’ include Brazil, China, India, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and so on, although some of them have long history as donors, like China from the 1950s. According to Myriam Saidi

| Table 1: ODA gross disbursements (OECD DAC definition; US$ million) |
|-------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|               | US      | France  | Germany | UK      | Japan   |
| Total ODA flows 2009 | 29,659.20 | 15,538.80 | 13,342.30 | 11,698.30 | 16,452.10 |
| Total ODA to Africa | 7,997.80  | 6,445.50  | 2,297.40  | 2,932.00  | 1,932.90  |
| % Africa of total ODA | 27       | 41       | 17       | 25       | 12       |
| Total ODA flows 2009 | 1,947.70  | 488.00   | 362.00   | 707.20   | 1,038.24  |
| Total ODA to Africa | n.a.     | 25.93    | n.a.     | 46.96    | 147.19    |
| % Africa of total ODA | 25       | 5-10     | 12       | 7        | 14        |


On the recipients’ dissatisfaction against unilateral application of poverty reduction, for example, see; Bartholomew Amah, 2008, “From SAPs to PRSPs: A Tale of Two Paradigms or Simply a Tale?,” in Joe Amoako-Tuffour and Bartholomew Armah eds., Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action: Perspectives and Lessons from Ghana, Lanham: Lexington Books, pp.73-91.
and Christina Wolf, it is possible to distinguish Asian donors and the others including Brazil and the Middle Eastern countries by their means and motivation; while the former tends to use various types of capital based on their economic self-interests, the latter makes much of grants\(^7\).

To discuss emerging donors or Asian donors as a whole is beyond the scope of a brief paper. We shall concentrate on China as one of the representative Asian donors, and on its Africa approach as one of the subjects of world-wide controversy. Let us roughly confirm the characteristics or the differences from western donors accordant with two points presented in the OECD’s report.

First, China’s development cooperation is not usually based on grants, but on providing capital. China has three types of aid; grants, zero-interest loans, and low-interest ‘concessional’ loans with subsidised interest rates\(^8\). In addition, it generally uses export credits for both sides, buyers and sellers, on a large scale, and resource-backed lines of credits, which are schemes for the finance of infrastructures repaying the loans through resource exports. China’s financial flow to Africa between 2007 and 2009 is estimated to be about US$7.1 billion in total, which is more than the estimation of its total aid qualified with the DAC’s criteria of ODA in the same period, which is US$1.9 billion\(^9\). The means using capital in various ways contrasted with western donors’ aid after the mid-1990s, making much of grants as aid for low-income countries.

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Second, China’s development cooperation is heavily composed of the development of infrastructures and agriculture, unlike western donors that focus on BSS. According to the government of China (GOC), by the end of 2009, 61% of concessional loans were used to construct transportation, communications and electricity infrastructure in developing countries. Table 2 shows China’s commitment pledged at each conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) since 2000. We can see that most of China’s aid to Africa has been composed of infrastructure, although the proportion is different by time. In addition, it must be noted that Beijing focuses on project-based aid, and this is also different from the international community’s trend, which makes much of the Sector-Wide Approaches.

In addition to these two, although this is a point which is briefly mentioned by Saidi and Wolf, it is important to note that Beijing is not actively commit to the recipients internal affairs. As mentioned above, western donors have often used aid as a leverage for particular purposes like protection of human rights, democratisation, good governance, and so on, since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it is hard to deny that western donors established even the trend of poverty reduction outside of the recipients. On the contrary, Beijing seldom even makes a comment about the recipients’ internal affairs, and does not explicitly require them to implement any development strategies. It will be useful to keep these points in mind as we examine the disputes over aid between western donors and China.

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| FOCAC I  (2000) | Financial commitments | • cancel debt up to RMB 10 bn for the HIPC and LDCs |
|                | Health               | • send extra medical teams |
|                | Education            | • grant more scholarships to African students to study in China |
|                | Environment          | • cooperate in environmental management |
|                | Trade & Investment   | • establish China-Africa Joint Business Council and China-Africa Products Exhibition Centre |
|                | Human resource       | • establish an African Human Resources Development Fund |
| FOCAC II (2003) | Financial commitments | • increase assistance for Africa (no figures provided) |
|                | Cultural cooperation | • hold a China-Africa Youth Festival in China in 2004 |
|                | Trade & Investment   | • open up market and grant tariff-free access to some commodities from LDCs |
|                | Human resource       | • train up to 10,000 African personnel in various fields |
|                | others               | • grant Approved (Tourism) Destination Status to eight African countries |
| FOCAC III (2006) | Financial commitments | • cancel debt owned by HIPC and LDCs matured interest-free loans due in 2005 |
|                | Health               | • double the 2006 assistance to Africa |
|                | Education            | • provide US$ 3 bn as preferential loans and US$2bn as preferential buyer’s credit |
|                | Environment          | • build 30 hospitals, provide RMB300 mil for anti-malaria drug, build 30 malaria prevention centres |
|                | Trade & Investment   | • build 100 rural schools, increase scholarships for African students from 2,000 per year to 4,000 per year |
|                | Agriculture          | • increase the number of zero-tariff export items from 190 to 440 for the 30 African LDCs |
|                | Human resource       | • set up the China-Africa Development Fund, an investment fund with US$ 5 bn |
|                | others               | • train 15,000 African professional |
|                |                      | • dispatch 300 youth volunteers |
|                |                      | • build an African Union conference centre |
| FOCAC IV (2009) | Financial commitments | • provide US$10 bn in concessional loans, and US$1bn as loans for African SMEs |
|                | Health               | • cancel debt associated with interest-free loans due to mature by the end of 2009 |
|                | Education            | • provide medical equipment and anti-malaria equipment worth RMB500 mil to hospitals and malaria prevention centres and train 3,000 doctors and nurses |
|                | Environment          | • build 50 schools, train 1,500 principals, and increase government scholarships to Africa to 5,500 within 3 years |
|                | Cultural cooperation | • propose implementation of the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education |
|                | Trade & Investment   | • promote mutual visits of press department officials, editors and journalists |
|                | Agriculture          | • support Chinese enterprises to invest the tourism sector in Africa |
|                | Human resource       | • increase the number of demonstration centres to 20, send 50 technology teams, and train 2,000 agricultural experts |
|                |                      | • train 20,000 professionals in various fields |
| FOCAC V (2012) | Financial commitments | • provide a credit line of US$20 bn, and RMB600 mil to the African Union |
|                | Health               | • encourage Chinese financial institutions to support African SMEs |
|                | Education            | • send 1,500 medical workers to Africa |
|                | Environment          | • provide US$ 2 mil annually under the framework of the UNESCO trust fund to support education development programs in Africa, in particular higher education |
|                | Cultural cooperation | • continue to share with African countries the data from the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite for environment surveillance |
|                | Trade & Investment   | • hold a China-Africa Radio and Television Cooperation Forum |
|                | Agriculture          | • propose to implement the China-Africa Think Tanks 10+10 Partnership Plan |
|                | Human resource       | • zero-tariff treatment to products under 97% of all tariff items from African LDCs |
|                |                      | • provide US$ 5 bn for good use of the China-Africa Development Fund |
|                |                      | • send professionals and build more technology demonstration centres |
|                |                      | • encourage Chinese financial institutions to support Chinese and African business |
|                |                      | • launch an African Talents Program to train 30,000 Africans in various sectors including to provide 18,000 scholarships |

(Source) FOCAC website (http://www.focac.org/eng/)
1-3 Criticism against China

As emerging donors’ presence grew larger in developing countries, concerns against it appeared in the West in the mid-2000s. On 7 December 2006, Adnan Mazarei, a director of the IMF, warned African countries “to avoid another round of debt accumulation” caused by numerous loans by emerging donors, in the *Financial Times*\(^{11}\). This was followed by Moisés Naím’s column in the *New York Times* on 15 February 2007, “Help Not Wanted”. In this article, Naím pointed out that emerging donors undermined development policy of the recipient and western donors through providing unnecessary projects without bids or conditions in order to gain their own benefits, and he named that ‘rogue aid’\(^{12}\). Both of them mainly argued about China, and these triggered fierce criticism against it.

This wave was back-grounded by the Darfur conflict. In western Sudan, Janjaweed, Arab militia, began to attack and occupy villages in 2003. It was said that Janjaweed was supported by President Omar Al-Bashir, and the International Criminal Court issued the first warrant of arrest for him on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity on 4 March 2009. However, while the US, which had appointed Sudan as one of the ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ since 1993, insisted on the introduction of sanctions against the government of Sudan at the Security Council, China and Russia opposed full-scale sanctions based on the logic of ‘non-interference’. On the other hand, since the late 1990s China had been the biggest investor in Sudan, the sixth-ranked oil-producing country within Africa at that time. It follows from what has been said that the Darfur conflict was the critical turning point for China’s image; ‘a state pursuing


economic interests without caring of human rights.’ As a result, China has been much more criticised by the West than the other emerging donors or Asian donors.

Let me examine the criticisms accordant with three points which we considered in the last subsection; various capital flow, building infrastructure, and passiveness to commit the recipients’ internal affairs.

First, the commitment with various capitals has been a point in question, since that makes the distinction between aid and economic activities vague. In particular, as Mazarei pointed out, considering that western donors have implemented debt relief of low-income countries since the introduction of the HIPC initiative, it is no wonder that they have concerns about the danger of the loans raising the debt burden of low-income countries again. Moreover, it is no doubt that the huge capital flow from China is one of factors accelerating the relaxation of resource-rich recipients’ fiscal control.

Second, viewed from the standardised ethical standpoint, poverty reduction, which focuses on BSS, numerous development cooperation inclined toward infrastructures seems a ‘deviation’ to begin with, regardless of their usefulness or not. In addition, building big infrastructures tends to depend on loans. Moreover, in most cases, Chinese companies exclusively accept orders of the projects, and the recipient governments have to purchase at least half of the necessary goods for the construction from China in accordance with the contracts. Therefore China’s aid to Africa has contributed to the increase of the former’s exports to the latter. Hence, it is no wonder that China’s development cooperation has been criticised for seeking its own economic

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interests.

Finally, China’s passiveness to engage in the recipients’ internal affairs has often been condemned by the West, because it substantially ignores serious human rights abuse like the Darfur conflict, and enables authoritarian rulers to survive politically. China has invited the delegations not only from Sudan but also from Eritrea and Zimbabwe to the FOCAC, while some western countries have made sanctions to the three countries mainly due to their poor conditions of human rights. As a result, the FOCAC is often regarded as a representative part of the ‘Beijing Consensus’, a China-centred network composed of authoritarian regimes embracing state-capitalism, by western critics.\footnote{Stefan Halper, 2010, \textit{The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century}, New York: Basic Books.}

\section*{1-4 Objections and adjustments by China}

The spread of criticism arose over a dispute between western donors and China on development cooperation\footnote{On further details of China’s objections, for example, see; Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power, 2010, \textit{op.cit.}; Joseph Y. S. Cheng and Huangao Shi, 2009, “China’s African Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary Asia}, 39(1), pp.87-115.}. As a reaction against criticisms, the GOC issued \textit{China’s Foreign Aid} in 2011, and explicaited China’s principles including five basic feature of development cooperation: (1) unremittingly helping recipient countries build up their self-development capacity; (2) imposing no political conditions; (3) adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common development; (4) remaining realistic while striving for the best; and (5) keeping pace with the times and paying attention to reform and innovation.\footnote{China Information Office of the State Council, 2011, \textit{op.cit.}} Out of these, the third point is especially noteworthy in examining China’s response to the first and second criticism, as mentioned above.
Appealing equality, mutual benefit and common development, Beijing emphasises that China is one of the developing countries. That implies a double meaning: (1) China is not a member of the DAC, and does not have an obligation to obey the poverty reduction guideline making much of BSS, grant, aid coordination, and so on; (2) gaining benefit through development cooperation is natural for developing countries, unlike developed countries. In addition, emphasising equality, Beijing insists that it does not coerce anything, and that development of infrastructure is based on the request from the recipients. In fact, China’s aid is mainly composed of request-base projects\(^{18}\). At the same time, one may say that this principle implies a criticism that western donors’ aid does not necessarily cover the low-income countries’ needs.

On the other hand, on the matter of human rights, we should not overlook the second point, imposing no political conditions. The GOC has been promoting the principle of ‘non-interference’ among sovereign states, according to traditional South-South cooperation since the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954. This turns to a criticism against the West attaching conditionality to aid, and it is no wonder that this diplomatic policy is generally supported by developing countries, in particular African countries which have an experience to be constantly ‘preached’ to by the West. In fact, declarations or action plans including the opposition against ‘political use of human rights’ or ‘double standard’ have been adopted at each conference of the FOCAC, even if the tone is different by time\(^ {19}\).

It follows from what has been said that Beijing presents a different view from the West’s standardised concept over development cooperation. However, while the GOC has not hesitated to have a fierce dispute with the West, it has adjusted

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\(^{19}\) Each document is accessible at the website of the FOCAC (http://www.focac.org/eng/).
its approach in Africa. As Table 2 shows, China’s commitment to development in Africa has rapidly increased since FOCAC III, and has gradually widened with its range, not only in trade and investment, but also in clean energy, financial services for the poor, technology transfer, and so on. In addition, numerous debt has been cancelled, providing new loans. Moreover, although it was not explicated in the documents of the FOCAC, the GOC increased its contribution to the UN missions for peace-keeping operations in Africa, and the numbers of troops overtook the USs’ by 2008.

Considering that international criticism against China’s approach began to spread in the mid-2000s, it is entirely fair to say that western criticism became a momentum of Beijing’s adjustment. However, we should notice that Beijing’s reaction was not only against western donors, but also against the recipients, because the friction between Chinese companies and local people became apparent in a lot of countries in the mid-2000s. For example, in August 2005, Ghana’s Chamber of Commerce required the delegation of China’s Ministry of Commerce to adjust its huge export surplus. In September 2006, the oil-exploitation by the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation in Loango National Park was stopped by the government of Gabon. In May 2009, the African Labour Research Network, which is composed of African union leaders and educators, published a report on the problems of Chinese enterprises, like payment under minimum wage. When China justifies its advance to Africa

with the logic of ‘mutual benefit’ or ‘common development’, it is hard for the former to ignore the latter’s complaint. From this view, it is no wonder that the GOC shifted its gears in the mid-2000s.

In parallel with this, China began to communicate with western donors, and to partly transmit information in the late-2000s. This was represented by the establishment of a studying group for aid with the DAC (2009), the foundation of a joint-meeting with African ecologist NGOs as a follow-up of the FOCAC IV (2010), the publication of white papers like *China’s Africa Policy* (2006) or *China’s Foreign Aid* (2011), which was mentioned above, and so on. It also should be added that these events followed the rise of attention to ‘soft power’ in Beijing, and President Hu Jintao repeatedly urged Chinese businesses to respect local laws during his visit to Africa eight months prior to his first official mentioning about ‘soft power’ in October 200724.

In sum, one may say that China has gradually shifted its attitude to Africa from ‘one of the developing countries’ to a ‘responsible state’ since the mid-2000s. That is symbolised by the fact that Hu did not use the words of ‘South-South cooperation’ in his keynote speech at the FOCAC V in 2012. However, of course it is exaggerated to say that China’s approach will overlap with western donors’ in the near future, because of the differences of diplomatic standpoints that they have with each other. On the other hand, illegal activities by Chinese companies or merchants have been often reported, even after Beijing’s shift25. Therefore one may say that the GOC faces double challenges;

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25 China Export-Import Bank has already requested a separate report about the potential environmental impact of any company applying for funding since 2004. See; Li Anshan, Liu Haifang, Pan Huaqiong, Zeng Aiping and He Wenping, 2012, “FOCAC Twelve Years Later:
justification of its standpoint to the West and Africa, and management of the internal players.

2. Transition and continuity of Japan’s approach

2-1 Outlook of Japan’s aid

It was observed in the preceding section that China has risen as the biggest emerging donor in Africa. Now that we are sure that there is a crevasse between western donors and China, the next step is to consider the position of Japan, the oldest Asian DAC member. As Brautigam succinctly pointed out, China’s development cooperation is quite similar to Japan’s. Based on the same viewpoint, Saidi and Wolf observed that Asian donors, especially China, ‘recycled’ Japan’s way. We will begin with a simple observation about Japan’s aid in accordance with three points which were focused on earlier.

First, let us confirm the kind of capital flow. Figure 1 shows the net and total gross amount of each DAC member’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), and the difference means inflow from the recipients’ repayment. We can see that loans occupy a much higher proportion in Japan’s ODA than in the other DAC members’. Figure 2 shows the DAC members’ Other Official Flows (OOF), which is official but less advantageous for the recipients than ODA in terms of the interest, and so on. It is obvious that Japan largely uses various capital flows other than grants, unlike most of western donors.

Second, we explore the purpose of aid. Figure 3 shows the ratio of social and administrative infrastructure in ODA, which is composed of education, health, good governance, and so on, and Figure 4 indicates the ratio of economic

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infrastructures. Compared with the other DAC members, Japan generally focuses on economic infrastructures in its ODA.

28 The GOJ announced a plan to revise the second edition in March 2014.
Third, and finally, we have to inquire into the relation between aid and recipients’ internal affairs. The government of Japan (GOJ) has twice published the ODA Charter as the guideline for its aid, in 1992 and 2003. These charters shared the same sentence in the preamble of its principle for providing ODA; “ODA will be provided in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.
especially sovereign equality and non-intervention in domestic matters) as well as the following points\textsuperscript{29}. We will consider the points later. What has to be noticed is that the GOJ dared to emphasise the doctrine of respect for sovereignty. In other words, Tokyo is generally passive in making use of ODA for the engagement in the recipients’ internal affairs.

In sum, Japan’s development cooperation has some commonalities with China’s. This tendency can be found in academic circles as well. It is not rare that development economists, especially those belonging to major or conservative schools in Japan, show scepticism against the current trend of western donors. In one of the most-used textbooks on development cooperation in Japan, Nishigaki et al argue “It is meaningless to adhere to the distinction between social infrastructure and economic infrastructure, if we aim to realise poverty reduction through smooth community development”, and “Aid coordination by western donors’ communities lowers the recipients’ bargaining power, and makes their freedom of choice small\textsuperscript{30}.”

One may say that this view is based on the belief that economic growth is the pre-condition for improving people’s well-being, and that giving grants is not necessarily good for the recipients because of the damaging effect it may have on their ownership or dignity, and they should refrain from interfering with sovereign states. Either way, it is certain that Japan’s aid includes hugely different tendencies from the DAC’s standardised approach.

2-2 Japan’s development cooperation in the Cold War era

These characteristics were more obvious in the early days of Japan’s aid, in the mid-1950s. Figure 5 shows the distribution of regions in which the GOJ provided ODA. Japan started its development cooperation as a form of

compensation for World War II, and the first case was the Baruchan No.2 hydroelectric power plant in Burma, which was agreed upon in 1954.31 Regarding this path, it was natural that its ODA was concentrated on East Asia, including Southeast Asia, in those days. Besides, reflected by the inclination

31 http://www.kajima.co.jp/english/prof/overview/history_07.html
toward infrastructure, as Figure 6 shows, Japan’s early ODA was heavily composed of loans. In addition, as a lot of scholars pointed out, Japanese companies exclusively undertook the projects, and the recipients had to purchase nearly half of their necessary goods from Japan.

However, Japan’s development cooperation has gradually shifted accordant with changes in the international environment and its position since the 1970s. The first turning point was to the Oil Crisis in 1973. The steep rise in price of natural resources compelled Japan to diversify the supplying countries. As a result, the GOJ began to widen the range of recipients for its aid, particularly in South Asia and the Middle East in the late 1970s, as Figure 5 shows.

In addition, the GOJ faced another factor of the change in the mid-1970s; bashing against Japan. In 1974, riots broke out in Bangkok and Jakarta during the visit of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. That represented the antipathy against Japan’s economic over-presence in Southeast Asia, its main target of trade and investment combined with aid. As a result, in 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo presented his doctrine concerning relations with Southeast Asia in Manila and the G7 Bonn Summit; remaining non-military power, constructing heart-to-heart relations with ASEAN members, and equal partnerships with ASEAN members. Along with the doctrine, Tokyo pledged to provide ODA of US$1 billion to ASEAN.

Yet Japan faced its next bashing in the 1980s. As Japan became one of the biggest donors, its approaches were criticised by the other DAC members on some points; the low ratio of its grant element, the low ratio of its aid for the Least Developing Countries, its tied loans, aid inclining toward infrastructures rather than basic human needs, Japanese companies’ exclusive undertaking of projects, and so on. That was back-grounded not only by Japan’s huge export surplus to them, but also by the explicit dissatisfaction of the Reagan administration against its insufficient ‘burden sharing’ in terms of security.
Faced with criticism from the Western camp, the GOJ gradually adjusted its approach; the numbers of non-Japanese companies, which were allowed to bid for Japan’s ODA projects, gradually increased through the 1980s, the Nakasone-Reagan summit in 1985 agreed to implement bilateral consultation over providing ODA, and so on. In parallel with this, the GOJ began to appeal its ‘responsibility’ as a power; “For Japan, … its aid policy is considered to be gaining wide support both at home and abroad as matching its national interests and as one of the most effective means to contribute to the international society.” In other words, by the late 1980s, the GOJ began to make much of aspects of ODA not only for mitigating frictions with other countries, but also for rising its international prestige as a power through contributing to the recipients’ economic prosperity and the reduction of international tensions.

However, prior to the determination of evaluation on its adjustment, the GOJ faced both overseas and internal criticism at the end of the 1980s over the passiveness to engage in the recipients’ internal affairs. In those days, negative aspects of Japan’s ODA were becoming known by the Japanese public because of advocacy by liberal schools. Sumi accused that the natural environment or ethnic minority’s livelihood was damaged by Japan’s ODA projects, which were implemented under the low-transparent relationships with corrupt recipient governments. In parallel with this, Tokyo further came under fire internationally because of the principle of ‘separation of politics from economics (seikei bunri)’. In 1988, Japan, with Australia and New Zealand, was condemned by almost all African countries at the UN General

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Assembly, because it continued to trade with South Africa under economic sanctions by the UN due to the Apartheid regime. The huge condemnation made Japan finally decide to retract ‘separation of politics from economics’, and recognise the economic sanction. These international and internal criticisms cultivated the soil of Japan’s shift in the 1990s.

### 2-3 Trial for adjustment in the 1990s

In 1990s, Tokyo endeavoured to transform its development cooperation, in particular regarding the relationship between aid and recipients’ internal affairs. That was back-grounded not only by 1988 UN General Assembly, but also by the end of the Cold War in 1989. Faced with the collapse of the bipolar system, the GOJ, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began to appeal the necessity of the Security Council’s reform accordant with current contribution to the UN, in order to make a new international order. In other words, the end of the Cold War was a momentum which Japan tried to shift from being an ‘economic power’ to becoming a ‘politico-economic power.’ On the other hand, almost all western donors stated that they would link their aid with human rights or democracy in the recipient countries in 1990. This made the GOJ adjust its development cooperation as its main diplomatic means.

Next, we shall concentrate on Japan’s ODA Charter that was adopted in 1992. Within this, the GOJ basically adhered to the doctrine of respect for sovereignty as the basic philosophy; “Japan attaches central importance to the support for the self-help efforts of developing countries towards economic take-off”.

On the other hand, the familiarity with the ‘universal values’ or the trend of the international community was explicated, and the basic philosophy was followed by four principles for providing aid: (1) pursuing environmental conservation and development in tandem; (2) avoiding any use of ODA for military purposes;
(3) paying full attention to trends in recipients’ military expenditures, their development and production of mass destruction weapons, their export and import of arms, etc.; (4) paying full attention to efforts for promoting democratisation and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country\(^37\). Out of these, especially the fourth point was almost same as western donors’, and one may say that the GOJ emphasised to absorb the trend of the international community.

However, it does not mean that the GOJ stood on same position as western donors. In his panel data analysis based on the facts from 1986 to 2002, Furuoka observed that there was no evidence that Japan employed its ODA as a leverage to promote human rights\(^38\). In fact, Japan often did not freeze ODA for recipients, especially with Asian countries that have close economic ties with it, which western donors sanctioned against; Myanmar after the coup in 1988, Indonesia after the Santa Cruz incident in 1991, Cambodia under military rule in 1997, and so on. On the other hand, it was not unusual that Tokyo increased ODA to its recipients when positive signs appeared in terms of the protection of human rights. Regarding this, the GOJ emphasised that it did not apply its standards automatically, instead made much of ‘friendly persuasion’ and ‘quiet and patient diplomacy’\(^39\). Either way, to say the least, Tokyo was not necessarily active to commit to the recipients’ internal affairs even after the publication of the ODA Charter.

Moreover, the difference from western donors was clearer on the development cooperation. Based on the fundamental persistence of its aid style,

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\(^37\) *ibid.*

a kind of ‘big push approach’, the GOJ often challenged the trend of western donors’ communities, even if that tone was generally moderate. For example, in 1993, Tokyo supported the World Bank to publish the *East Asian Miracle*, which surveyed the experience of economic growth in eight Asian countries including Japan, and showed the role of the governments promoting a market economy\(^{40}\). One may say that this was a trial to appeal an alternative development model against Neo-Liberalism. Yet the *East Asian Miracle* attracted little attention in western donors’ communities, although it was generally and positively evaluated in Japanese academic or aid circles. It was represented by the fact that the IMF applied the Neo-Liberal SAPs to Thailand or South Korea after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997. Rather, the AFC encouraged the arguments over ‘failure of Crony Capitalism’ in the West\(^{41}\).

Another challenge of Japan was against the introduction of the HIPC\(^{s}\) initiative, and it moderately but clearly opposed appealing the concern about ‘moral hazard’ of the recipients. However, faced with isolation in the DAC influenced by western public opinion including the Vatican, the GOJ reluctantly followed the trend of poverty reduction based on the HIPC\(^{s}\) initiative\(^{42}\). As a result, as we can see in Figure 6, the ratio of loans in Japan’s ODA rapidly decreased after 1999 when the expanded HIPC\(^{s}\) initiative was adopted by the BWIs based on recognition by G8 summit. In short, the GOJ experienced a ‘sense of failure’ in the realm of development cooperation twice in the 1990s, and that was a factor of Japan’s further adjustment in the 2000s.


2-4 Two signs in the 2000s

In the 2000s, two signs appeared in the GOJ’s development cooperation; strengthening its traditional approach, and emphasising human security. Out of these, the former became considerable, especially in the late 2000s. As Figure 7 shows, the ratio of economic infrastructure in the GOJ’s ODA began to increase in 2008, although it had been decreasing since the late-1990s, when the global poverty reduction regime was established. In parallel with this, as we can see in Figure 8, the volume of Japan’s OOF gradually increased in the late 2000s. These were immediately caused by the World Financial Crisis, and had an aspect as Japan’s commitment for preventing economic depression in developing countries. On the other hand, we must not forget the international plate-tectonics in the 2000s, and do need to be reminded of the path of the GOJ’s development cooperation by the early 2000s.

As Figure 9 shows, the DAC members, especially the US, rapidly began to increase ODA in the early 2000s. That was caused not only by strengthening the global poverty reduction regimes, but also by beginning the war on terrorism and the spread of the recognition that, ‘poverty is the root cause of terrorism’. In addition, we should notice that the appearance of emerging donors and the steep rise of natural resources’ price fuelled this tendency.

Within this environment, it is no wonder that there was a sense of impatience in the GOJ; obeying the global poverty reduction regime seemed inconvenient for Japan, especially because the trend of aid inclining toward BSS restricted its comparative advantage of building infrastructures. The following, which is presented in the revised ODA Charter in 2003, is understandable in this context;

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43 The detail of each project is searchable at the JICA’s database (http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/index.html).
“Japan will utilize its own experience in economic and social development as well as in economic cooperation when assisting the development of developing countries, fully taking into account the development policies and assistance needs of developing countries."^{44}

As mentioned above, Tokyo experienced a ‘sense of failure’ on development cooperation twice in the 1990s; less attention to the East Asian Miracle, and the

introduction of the HIPC initiative. Meanwhile there was a ‘sense of success’ in Tokyo on its experience in Southeast Asia; the region, in which Japan had focused on, finally became a centre of economic growth, and overtook the average income of Sub Saharan Africa, in which European countries had been the main donors. One may say that the international plate tectonics in the 2000s exacerbated this complex, and that was fuelled by the global recession.

However, that does not mean a recursion to simple ‘big-push approach’ based on the trickle-down hypothesis. In the 2003 ODA Charter, while the GOJ recognised the importance of BSS, it emphasised the necessity of sustainable economic growth as the precondition of poverty reduction, and insisted on compatibility of the both. In short, Tokyo connected the international community’s trend with its own tradition; poverty reduction and economic growth. Besides, the connection is related to another sign in Japan in the 2000s; emphasising human security.

Although the 2003 ODA Charter inherited four principles of ODA from the

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older version, they were placed behind the ‘basic policies’, which had not been in the former version. The basic policies included five points: (1) supporting self-help efforts of developing countries; (2) perspective of ‘human security’; (3) assurance of fairness; (4) utilisation of Japan’s experience and expertise; (5) partnership and collaboration with the international community. Besides, it is stated that “Japan will carry out ODA even more strategically, in accordance with the … basic policies”\(^47\). It is hard to deny that emphasising its individual view as the basic policies overshadowed the principles, including the respect of ‘universal values’ like human rights and democracy.

Either way, out of the basic policies, human security was the notion which Tokyo had already paid attention to since the late 1990s\(^48\). In 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo first mentioned human security during his visit to Southeast Asia shortly after the AFC. Thereafter, Japan began to provide aid in the name of human security like establishing the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (1999), launching the Commission on Human Security (COHS) (2001), and renaming the Grant Assistance for Grassroots, one of its ODA items, to the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (2003), and so on.

According to the final report of the COHS co-chaired by Ogata Sadako, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Amartya Sen, “Human security naturally connects several kinds of freedom- such as freedom from want and freedom from fear, as well as freedom to take action on one’s own behalf. Ensuring human security expands ‘the real freedoms that people enjoy’.”\(^49\) What


has to be noticed is that Tokyo focuses on ‘freedom from want’ rather than ‘freedom from fear’. In fact, most of the projects by the GOJ’s Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects are for improving the poor’s livelihood\textsuperscript{50}.

On the other hand, the GOJ has kept away from the Human Security Network (HSN), which was established in 1999 with an initiative of Canada and Norway and has endorsed the discipline of ‘humanitarian intervention’ like the military action by NATO in Kosovo or Serbia in 1999. Although they use same words, human security, the standpoint of the HSN’s members are different from Japan on the point that they make much of ‘freedom from fear.’ One may say that the difference of the emphasis over human rights is reflected in the difference. Most of the governments of Asian countries, including Japan, often and publicly appeal the importance of economic, social and cultural rights rather than civil and political rights\textsuperscript{51}. In short, while the HSN tends to focus on human security in terms of civil and political rights, the GOJ tends to focus on economic, social and cultural rights.

What has to be noticed is that the mainstream of Tokyo’s aid circle insists on the fundamental consistency between human security, especially ‘freedom from want’, and its traditional approach focuses on infrastructure. For example, in 2004, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) redefined infrastructure as ‘a foundation of basic services, guaranteeing all people the right to live in safety and good health and ultimately helping them realize their dormant potentials by self-empowerment,’ and emphasised that infrastructure

\textsuperscript{50} The data of Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects is accessible at the MOFA’s website (http://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/bilateral/oda/grassroots.html).

was a necessary element for pro-poor development\textsuperscript{52}. At the same time, ‘infrastructure for people’ became the JICA’s slogan on the basis of recognising problems of the earlier projects like infrastructure gap, environmental destruction, and so on.

That could be called a kind of eclecticism. However, what should be noticed is that Japan takes a course between the bottom-up approach, or the West’s poverty reduction, and the trickle-down approach, or China’s ‘big-push’. On the other hand, Tokyo never explicitly criticises the West’s interference with the recipients’ internal affairs appealing civil and political rights, although it emphasises human security in terms of economic, social and cultural rights. Therefore one may say that in terms of the doctrine, Japan is in the crevice between western donors and China in a double sense.

3. Japan in the New Scramble

3-1 A sketch of the New Scramble

Having observed the current dispute over development cooperation between western donors and China or Asian donors, particularly in Africa, and noticing Japan’s individuality as a donor, one can then go on to consider the GOJ’s concrete commitment and the relations with the other two camps. The question which we must consider next is Japan’s engagement in Africa. Yet before that is considered, let us pause here to look briefly at contemporary relations between Africa and the global powers.

As overseas economic interests rose, capital flow to Africa grew rapidly, and the type of capital flow has changed. Figure 10 shows the DAC members’ ODA to Africa. Regarding that most of them decreased aid to Africa after the end of the Cold War, the change in the 2000s is considerable. On the other hand, as

mentioned above, emerging donors have appeared as powerful aid providers in Africa, although the details are unclear. In addition, as Figure 11 shows, what has to be noticed is that the investment flow to Africa became more than aid in the mid-2000s.

The current rush to Africa by global powers is called the New Scramble. While the former scramble was a competition between European countries to colonise in the nineteenth century, the most eager players in the New Scramble are the US and China, the largest traders with Africa especially imports. While China increased its imports from Africa from US$3.2 billion in 2001 to US$66.9 billion in 2012, the US increased its imports from US$19.7 billion to US$61.2 billion. In addition, the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI)

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54 On the other hand, the volume of exports has a huge difference. While China increased its exports to Africa from US$4.6 billion in 2001 to US$86.7 billion in 2012, the US increased its imports from US$10.6 billion to US$35.8 billion. IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook*, Washington, D.C.: IMF.
from these to Africa has narrowed since the late 2000s. According to Brautigam, while the US’s net FDI inflows to Africa increased from US$2.56 billion in 2005 to US$3.71 billion in 2012, China’s increased from US$0.39 billion to US$2.52 billion.\(^\text{55}\)

In parallel with economic competition, the US and China stand in front of the dispute over the approaches. In June 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned African governments and people to be cautious; “We saw that during colonial times, it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave. And when you leave, you don’t leave much behind for the people who are there. We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa.”\(^\text{56}\)

Against this statement, the GOC insisted that “There is a broad consensus among African nations that China is not pursuing a neo-colonial strategy in Africa”, and “China has also funded infrastructure and industrialization projects

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\(^{55}\) China in Africa: The Real Story (website run by Deborah Brautigam) (http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/p/chinese-fdi.html).

that the West has refused to fund since the days of colonialism. It is to be hoped that these projects will finally help Africa modernize - a dream that seems attainable for the first time since independence\textsuperscript{57}.”

However, while they confront each other diplomatically, the US and China share some characteristics. They have legal frameworks to propel non-tariff imports from African countries; the US established the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000, and China firstly explicated it at the FOCAC II in 2003. Besides both of them promote ‘assisting Africa’s economic growth through promoting trade’, but more than seventy percent of the two countries’ imports from Africa is fuel\textsuperscript{58}. Nearly one may say that Washington and Beijing tend to stress the differences between one another despite their commonality.

This tangled rivalry is fuelled by the structure of the New Scramble. In the former scramble, each power could exclusively grip the influence and wealth in its segment. On the contrary, in the New Scramble, all foreign players can approach almost all African countries under the rule of free trade, except for special cases like the US and Zimbabwe, and so on. In short, the competition is tougher and more complicated than that of the colonial days, because it is hard for global powers to co-exist separately by demarcation. In that sense, one may say that the situation under the Cold War was more similar to the colonial days’ rather than to todays’, at least for the foreign players.

Considering it from a different perspective, the current situation made African governments recover their bargaining power against the West, in which they have had a huge influence especially since the 1980s. In the open-door race, the

\textsuperscript{57} Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Chicago, 10 December 2011 (http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/zt/zgwjzc/t885978.htm).

\textsuperscript{58} According to the statistics of the WTO, the amount of fuel import of the US from Africa was about US$77 billion, and that of China was about US$49 billion, in 2011. In the same year, the total merchandise import of the US from Africa was about US$95 billion, while that of China was US$69 billion. WTO, 2012, \textit{International Trade Statistics 2012}, Geneva: World Trade Organization, p.31, 78, 237.
relations with African governments have a critical meaning for foreign players, particularly licencing to develop natural resources. In other words, the New Scramble is a momentum for global powers to seek ‘friendly’ relations with them. From this view, it is no wonder that the West tends to refrain from condemning human rights abuse in resource-rich countries under pro-western authoritarian regimes, like Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and so on, and that resource-rich economies are prone to cause non-transparent relations with foreign companies, regardless of their nationality.\(^{59}\)

On the other hand, the Arab Spring gave foreign players a lesson; they have to pay attention to public opinion or local people’s reactions more than ever, due to their influence based on the spread of democratic norms and information tools. It is symbolised by anti-US sentiment in Egypt after Mubarak, and anti-Chinese sentiment in Libya after Gaddafi. In other words, it is necessary for the foreign players to avoid the situation in which they solely hold close relations with the regimes, and to frequently and widely appeal their contribution or usefulness not only for the governments in Africa, but also for the people, now so more than ever. One can safely state that the New Scramble further promotes all global powers’ interest in ‘soft power’ or ‘public diplomacy’.

Viewed in this light, the New Scramble includes competitions not only for economic presence, but also for the discourse of ‘Africa’s friendship’. Besides, it is hard to deny that aid is still a major means for getting favour in Africa, even if it is not only one. Hence, one may say that Africa is an arena in which donors confront each other and present their doctrines over development cooperation.

\(^{59}\) For example, see; Ian Gary and Terry Lynn Karl, 2003, *Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor*, Baltimore: Catholic Relief Service (http://www.artsm.ualberta.ca/courses/PoliticalScience/474A1/documents/IanGaryandTerryLynnKarlBottomoftheBarrelAfricaOilPoor.pdf).
2-2 Transition of the TICAD

As the New Scramble became fierce, the GOJ’s Africa policy began to shift accordant with its general transition; strengthening its traditional approach, and emphasising human security. Let us consider that by confirming each conference of the TICAD.

Unlike conferences like the French-Africa Summit or the Commonwealth Summit hosted by the other DAC members, the TICAD has been pierced by the ideals of ‘ownership and partnership’. As a result, the delegations of Eritrea, Sudan and Zimbabwe, which have not been invited to the US’s AGOA Forum, have smoothly attended each conference of the TICAD. In the case of the Africa-EU summit in 2007, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown did not attend the meeting, protesting the presence of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. On the contrary, the action plans of the FOCAC, which also emphasise self-determination and equal partnership, almost always include criticism against ‘political use of human rights’ by the West, based on the ideal of ‘South-South cooperation’. Viewed in this light, one may say that the TICAD is generally a non-political or pragmatic conference, except for its appeal on UN reforms.

As confirmed in the last section, however, the liberal tone was comparatively high in the GOJ’s doctrine over development cooperation in the 1990s. That was reflected in the speeches or commitments which were presented at TICAD in those days. Table 3 shows points of the main speeches at the conferences of TICAD. For example, at TICAD I, Prime Minister HosokawaMorihiro appreciated Africa’s effort for politico-economic reform, and Foreign Minister Hata Tsutomu emphasised Japan’s will to contribute the process. One may say that that represented the GOJ’s reaction to the trend after the end of the Cold War.

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| TICAD I (1993) | Japan considers of great importance in its future relations with Africa. |
| Prime Minister HOSOKAWA Morihiro | Firstly, Japan highly appreciates that the African countries are opting for reform efforts at their own initiative. |
| | Secondly, we will provide active assistance to the human resources development in Africa. |
| | Finally, through mutual efforts, we hope to build an “unfailing friendship” with the African nations beyond a mere donor-recipient relationship. |
| TICAD II (1998) | There are five main criteria of assistance by which Japan will translate its resolve into concrete policy measures. |
| Foreign Minister HATA Tsutomu | Firstly, Japan will endeavor to contribute to progress in political processes in Africa. |
| | Secondly, Japan will continue to assist actively economic reforms in Africa. |
| | Thirdly, Japan will actively assist human resources development, because it is indispensable for the effective pursuit of nation-building. |
| | Fourthly, Japan will pay further attention to environmental problems in Africa. |
| | Lastly, Japan’s ODA policy will be guided by its emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency of assistance. |
| TICAD III (2003) | Japan intends to continue to contribute actively to development in Africa. And in so doing, we will in particular emphasize the following. |
| Prime Minister OBUCHI Keizo | Firstly, Japan respects African countries’ own initiative and ownership of their own development. |
| | The importance of ownership in development is one of the lessons we learned from our own experience in development cooperation via our our partner countries in Asia. |
| | Second, highly industrialized countries should continue to extend hands of solidarity and support to African countries in order to assist them in their development efforts. |
| | Third, I cannot over-emphasize that political stability, through the resolution and prevention of conflict and the advancement of democratization is indispensable for development in Africa. |
| | Fourth, we wish to emphasize South-South cooperation. In the context of this conference, the exchanges between Asia and Africa should be enhanced. |
| TICAD IV (2008) | I would like to take this opportunity to announce the three pillars that comprise Japan’s initiative for assistance to Africa. |
| Prime Minister KOZUMA Junichiro | The first pillar is “human-centered development.” It has been said that nation-building “starts and ends with people.” |
| | The second pillar is “poverty reduction through economic development.” Without economic growth, poverty cannot be reduced. |
| | The third pillar is “consolidation of peace.” Japan wishes to further dialogue with its African partners in order to address the question of how the people of Africa can become free from various threats against lives and human dignity including poverty, conflict and infectious diseases, in other words, how Japan can contribute to “human security.” |
| TICAD V (2013) | The time has come for the countries of Africa to adopt as their own a model that led to success in post-war Japan and many other Asian countries. That is to say, investment makes the economy grow, providing the momentum for further new investment, and thus encourages self-sustaining growth. Here at this juncture, Japan wants to walk alongside the African people, shoulder to shoulder. |
| Prime Minister FUKUDA Yasuo | In order to boost the momentum for African growth, the most important thing is the development of infrastructure. |
| | Activities by private companies are crucial for African growth. The Japanese government will implement measures to promote the activities of Japanese companies in Africa while it improves African infrastructure. |
| | In order to fully ensure growth in Africa, the development of agriculture is extremely important. |
| | Let all of us renew our determination to achieve the MDGs. |
| | Japan, as a “Peace-Fostering Nation,” intends to focus more on the consolidation of peace and peacebuilding in Africa. |

(Source) TICAD website (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/index.html)
On the other hand, at early TICADs, it was also apparent that Japan’s bilateral aid and arrangements for economic exchange for its own benefit were generally limited. Table 4 shows the commitments pledged by the GOJ at TICAD. We can see that the GOJ emphasised multilateral approaches, like assisting Africa through international organisations, or promoting South-South cooperation between Africa and Southeast Asia at TICAD I or II. Considering that it was shortly after the worldwide ‘Japan bashing’, it is no wonder that Japan’s attitude was generally moderate at the early TICADs.

However, the GOJ showed a subtle but not negligible shift at TICAD III in 2003. In TICAD’s Tenth Anniversary Declaration, the GOJ followed the international community’s trend by cancelling the debt of US$3 billion held by African HIPCs. In addition, the multilateral approaches were also emphasised, e.g. the Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference in cooperate with the World Bank. On the other hand, ODA for developing infrastructures and financial support for Japanese firms to invest in Africa were explicated in the commitment of TICAD for the first time.

The shift appeared not only in the commitment, but also in the keynote speech by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. In the ‘three pillars’ of Japan’s assistance, he mentioned ‘poverty reduction through economic growth’, and substantially appealed the difference from the West. Besides, Koizumi emphasised “Japan can contribute to ‘human security’.” It may be worth pointing out, that the words ‘human rights’, which had been mentioned in the Tokyo Declaration on African Development in 1993 twice and the Tokyo Agenda for Action in 1998 thrice, were not used in TICAD’s Tenth Anniversary Declaration at all. In short, TICAD III was the turning point accordant with the general shift of the GOJ’s development cooperation, which was represented by the revision of the ODA Charter in 2003.

The shift was accelerated at TICAD IV in 2008, especially in the aspect of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TICAD</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>Financial commitments</th>
<th>• increase the ODA by US$5bn within 5 years</th>
<th>• support SPA by the World Bank, and ESA by the IMF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Financial commitments</td>
<td>• provide JPY30bn as grant for debt relief</td>
<td>• provide JPY10bn for landmires clearance and victims support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Financial commitments</td>
<td>• double total ODA to Africa except for debt relief up to US$1.8 bn including US$1.4 bn of bilateral grants</td>
<td>• provide US$4 bn as ODA loan for infrastructure and agricultural development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Financial commitments</td>
<td>• provide US$32 bn including ODA of US$14 bn</td>
<td>• improve access to safe water and sanitary condition for 10 mil people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Financial commitments</td>
<td>• provide US$8.5 bn loan for infrastructure</td>
<td>• support SPA by the World Bank, and ESA by the IMF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source) TICAD website (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/index.html)
strengthening its traditional approach. Compared with the previous conferences, Japan’s commitment rapidly increased at TICAD IV. US$4 billion were pledged as ODA for infrastructures and agriculture, and in particular, the development of the One Stop Border Post (OSBP) system, regional roads network, was emphasised. Besides, financial support for Japanese firms to double investment for Africa was pledged up to US$2.5 billion. On the other hand, assistance for social development was also increased, and the target amount of aid was set for projects like building 1,000 schools with approximately 5,500 classrooms, training 100,000 teachers in math and science, and improving the management of 10,000 schools through local participation. One may say that Tokyo presented its full-scale approach at TICAD IV.

The GOJ further geared up at TICAD V in 2012, and promised to provide US$32 billion including ODA of US$14 billion. What should be noticed is not only that they pledged to provide US$6.5 billion as ODA and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation’s loan for building infrastructures, but also that they increased other types of capital including private investment. That was represented by US$2 billion for trade and investment insurance by the Nippon Export and Investment Insurance, or US$2 billion for public finance by the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, one of 102 Independent Administrative Institutions (Dokuritsu Gyosei Hohjin), or semi-private organizations receiving fiscal support from the government61.

On the other hand, the tone of emphasising human security has not necessarily been high, although it has been kept since TICAD III. As Table 3 shows, TICAD IV and V shared a commonality; economic growth was located at the first point of each of their three sub-themes, which was presented at the keynote speeches. Moreover, we can see that human security was dealt with as

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the concept complementing economic growth in the keynote speeches (By way of contrast, in the declarations and action plans which were adopted at TICAD IV and V, the words of human rights were used only one time in the Yokohama Declaration 2013). In sum, out of the two characteristics, strengthening its traditional approach has become clearer, emphasising human security, in TICAD. As a result, the non-political hue has been gradually stressed since TICAD III.

As mentioned above, the shift is accordant with the shift of Japan’s general shift over development cooperation in the 2000s. However, in addition to that, we must not forget three additional factors. First, one may say that the failure of the trial for the UN reform, partly caused by African countries passiveness in 2005, made Tokyo decide to gear up. Second, as with all countries, Japan is also not far apart from economic interests in Africa. Third, and finally, we should notice that the ‘China factor’ also promoted that. Out of these, when I speak of the China factor, I do not wish to imply that Japan stands on the same position with western donors represented by the US.

As Hughes pointed out, the rise of China made the ‘revisionist’ faction in Tokyo, which is more politically nationalistic and economically liberal than the post-War ‘pragmatic’ mainstream, accept China as a threat, and try to contain it globally\textsuperscript{62}. From this view, he described TICAD as a part of the chain containing China. But the matter is not quite as simple as Hughes suggests. Indeed the revisionists have tried to contain China globally, and have often criticised it in Africa\textsuperscript{63}. However, what should be noticed is that Tokyo has made use of Beijing’s influence for justifying Japan’s development cooperation


\textsuperscript{63} During his visit to African countries in January 2014, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo emphasised that Japan’s aid was ‘for Africa’, implying the difference from China. Sankei Shinbun, 15 January 2014 (http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/140115/plc14011500070001-n1.htm).
and securing its position in the DAC. In the following subsection, we shall look more carefully into the triangular relationship in Africa between China, western donors, and Japan.

**3-3 Heterodoxy, or Joker?**

It cannot be emphasised too strongly that Japan’s approach has further ‘deviated’ from the DAC’s standard especially since the early 2000s. However, the reactions of western donors are different from those in the 1980s, and they are generally permissive to Tokyo.

In the *Peer Review 2010*, the DAC exhibited a suspicion over the combination Japan’s traditional approach with human security; “JICA is trying to add a human security dimension to all of its work, from the smallest to the grandest project. But moving from policy to practice can be particularly challenging for larger projects, such as major economic infrastructure.” Moreover, the DAC pointed out the ambiguity of Japan’s practice over gender-related issue. On the other hand, its hybrid approach was evaluated as being generally positive; “Japan emphasises economic growth and focuses on major infrastructure projects. The addition of the ‘human security’ perspective has helped to promote a poverty dimension within an otherwise growth-orientated outlook. This has helped Japan to reflect better the MDGs and pro-poor growth in its approach.”

Western donors’ moderate reaction is back-grounded not only by Japan’s adjustment, but also by their caution against emerging donors, especially China. As emerging donors expanded their presence in developing countries, especially African countries, some observations aimed at adjusting the existing approaches

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65 *ibid.*, p.102.
appeared in the West. At the first Africa-EU summit in 2007, Portugal’s minister said that Europeans had been ‘excessively simplistic’ in insisting on European models of government for Africa\(^\text{67}\). In 2009, Jennifer Cooke of the Center of Strategic and International Studies explored China’s engagement in Africa, and recommended the US Congress to increase aid for building infrastructures in order to create a balance\(^\text{68}\). Moreover, although pursuing donors’ own benefits used to be recused among the West, in the 2000s they began to appeal ‘win-win’ relations with Africa, similar with emerging donors’ ‘equality and mutual benefit’. For example, the Africa-EU summit has been pierced by the principle of equal partnership\(^\text{69}\). It seems reasonable to suppose that there is some impatience among western donors against the advancement of China.

This impatience is based not only on the influence of the inter-governmental network centred by China, the so called ‘Beijing Consensus’, but also on African people’s acceptance of China. According to the Pew Research Centre’s report in 2013, there were not huge differences between the US and China in terms of the favour from African people; while the average ratio of favour to the former in Africa was 77%, the latter’s was 72\%\(^\text{70}\). China’s score in Africa is generally higher than that in the other regions. That is no wonder because, as

\(^{67}\) *The Economist*, 2007, *op.cit*.


\(^{70}\) Pew Research Center, 2013, “America’s global image remains more positive than China’s, but many see China becoming world’s leading power” (http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remains-more-positive-than-chinas/).
Moyo acutely pointed out, China’s big-push approach, regardless of whether it was more or less, contributed African countries’ rapid economic growth in the 2000s, in contrast to the period until the late 1990s when western countries’ aid had had exclusive influence. Indeed there is a lot of negative news over Chinese companies’ activities in Africa, but that does not necessarily mean that the West is much more favoured on the continent.

As a result, as mentioned above, there are some signs to reconsider their approaches in western donors. However, it is hard for them to justify the adjustment of their approaches, especially over human rights, because that can undermine their ‘soft power’, even if their ‘double standard’ and ‘political conditionality’ have been criticised by the recipients. Namely, western donors face a trade-off, and that makes them substantially allow Japan’s ‘deviation’. Although Japan’s ideal or means is quite different from the West, it is finally their colleague in terms of international politics, and, unlike China, is never opposed to their stance emphasising civil and political rights. In other words, thanks to China’s predominant rush, Japan has been able to strengthen its traditional approach without facing huge criticism from the West as a result.

Within this environment, there are even cases in which western donors cooperate with the GOJ’s project. The OSBP programme which started in Chirundu, on the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe, is a typical example. The OSBP is aimed at speeding up border-crossing procedures by making export and import operational procedures simultaneous, and the projects generally aim to provide legal assistance, capacity building for trade procedure, infrastructure, and so on. Following the construction of a border bridge with a grant of about US$15 million in 2002, JICA agreed with both governments to build necessary equipment and provide technical cooperation in 2007. As a

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result, Chirundu’s post began to operate as the first OSBP on the continent in 2009. In parallel with this, OSBP has been emphasised as one of main targets since TICAD IV, and JICA has successively propelled other projects in Africa.72

What should be noticed is that JICA took the initiative to provide the project with the cooperation of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), particularly in capacity building, in Chirundu.73 Although the UK has implemented economic sanctions against the Mugabe administration, it is a general custom that political relations do not necessarily apply to humanitarian aid. However, it is doubtful that the OSBP inclusion of construction of infrastructure corresponds with humanitarian aid in the sight of the UK, even if the DFID was not responsible. In other words, it is entirely fair to suppose that the UK made use of the OSBP project at Chirundu as an opportunity to accomplish two things; to keep relations with its former colony, and to build infrastructures in Africa.

Similarly, US Aid for International Development or the World Bank also participated in some OSBP projects in which JICA undertook the position of a leading donor.74 As a result, they are generally quiet over JICA’s ODA for infrastructure as part of OSBP, like a project promised to build a cross-border bridge between Botswana and Zambia with a loan of up to JPY11.612 billion

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(approximately US$116 million) in 2012\textsuperscript{75}. In short, Japan complements western donors by taking the initiative on projects that western donors are hesitant about, and the latter virtually condones the former, even if Japan is a kind of ‘heterodoxy’ within the DAC.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, China’s approach is quite similar with Japan’s. Although Tokyo should be an unwelcome opponent for Beijing in terms of its comparative advantage, the former’s full-scale approach obscures the latter’s individuality. In a complicated game named the New Scramble, Japan being in the crevice between the West and China is a ‘wild card’ for the both sides.

**Summary and conclusion**

We have seen the shift and individuality of Japan’s development cooperation in the context of the New Scramble. In the race for ‘Africa’s friendship’, Japan takes a distinctive role. Tokyo does not adhere to standardised poverty reduction, but is quiet on the recipients’ internal affairs. However, the GOJ does not forget to colour almost all projects, including huge infrastructures, with the concept of human security, and to engage in African grassroots. One may say that Japan chose the way which seldom causes friction with the recipients.

Yet it is hard for Japan to become an ace or a king in the game, the New Scramble, because of its grey position. Unlike the West, Japan requires almost nothing from the recipient governments, and does not coerce them into any ideals. On the other hand, unlike Beijing, Tokyo is too westernised politically to defend them from the West. In short, while Tokyo’s quietness is its advantage to advance in Africa while avoiding trouble with the governments and their people, it is a disadvantage to making a critical impact in the game.

However, that does not mean that Japan has no role in the New Scramble. Indeed Japan’s approach is not attractive enough to gain numerous supporters, but it rarely makes oppositional relations not only with the recipients, but also with the West. Besides Japan’s approach has a commonality not only with the West, but also with China. Although its chameleonic feature is a limitation of Japan as a power, it also means that most of its players can be easily associated with it. Hence, one can safely state that players including Africa, who skilfully makes use of the wild card, will take an advantage in the game.

Rather, the grey position is an internal subject for the GOJ. According to research conducted by the Japan External Trade Organization in 2012, 57.8% of 168 Japanese enterprises doing business on the continent, as the largest number of respondents, answered “the most requisite support by the GOJ is to communicate with the partner governments in order to make them pay attention to requests by business.” As mentioned above, it is critical to have a close relationship with African governments in the New Scramble. On the other hand, it is well known that inadequate institutions or illegal activities by public servants make conducting business in Africa hard. Viewed in this light, indeed the GOJ’s approach seldom causes friction with the recipient governments, but it also means that it has little substantial influence to require them to improve the business environment or governance. Moreover, unlike Southeast Asia in the 1970s, Tokyo has few informal human networks with African governments. It seems reasonable to suppose that the situation does not necessarily promote the activities of Japanese enterprises. Therefore the GOJ’s current approach toward Africa includes a reversal characteristic, and it can undermine its ambition. In other words, as with other donors, it is time for Japan to reconsider its approach toward Africa.

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